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THE GERRYMANDERING OF STATE AND
FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTSt
By NEI.

TABOR*

I. INTRODUCTION
The apportionment of representatives to legislative
bodies and the rearrangement of the districts from which
they are elected have always presented difficult legal and
political problems.' It has been said that "Scarcely any
right more nearly relates to the liberty of the citizen and
the independence and the equality of the freeman in a republic than the method and conditions of his voting and
the efficacy of his ballot, when cast, for representatives in
the legislative department of Government."' Though it is
generally assumed that equality of representation according
to population is a desirable objective,' it is nevertheless a
•tThis article, originally prepared as a term paper for Professor Paul A.
Freund's Seminar in Constitutional Litigation at Harvard Law School in
1952, has been revised and recently brought to date by the author who,
while taking full responsibility for the views expressed, wishes to thank
Professor G; Kenneth Reiblich of the University uof Maryland Law School,
and Melvin J. Sykes, of the Baltimore City Bar, for their advice in its
final preparation.
* A.B., University of Maryland, 1948; LL.B., University of Maryland,
1951; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1952; Chairman, Student Editorial
Board, MARYLAND LAW REvIEw, 1951.
1 Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably in the cases,
reapportionment refers to ,the allotment to each legislative district of its
quota of representatives, while redistricting refers to the rearrangement of
the boundaries of such districts. In a relatively large number of instances,
the distinction is unnecessary due either to -the existence of single member
districts, or the allotment of representatives to a fixed political subdivision
within a state, such as a county. In the former, only a periodic redistricting
is required, while in the latter only reapportionment Is necessary.
Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 224
Mass. 598, 113 N. E. 581, 584 (1916).
1Of course, not all legislative bodies are established on this principle.
Representation according to states In the United States Senate is often
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fact that the widespread gerrymandering of legislative districts in this country has resulted in the partial disfranchisement of a large portion' of the electorate."
In the broadest sense of the term, any reapportionment
or redistricting smacking of political skullduggery may be
termed a gerrymander. In a more limited sense, gerrymandering has been defined as a partisan arrangement. of
election districts to secure an unfair advantage for one
political party (or other interest) within :a state.' The
dominant political party in the state legislature generally
accomplishes this objective by spreading its potential voting strength over a relatively large number of districts and
concentrating the opposition voters in as few as possible.'
historically defended on -the basis that, as a compromise between the large
and small states, the Senate was established as that organ of the national
legislature which was to represent thirteen formerly sovereign states. Whatever merit this may have on a national scale, it is generally true that as
far as the individual states are concerned, the cleavage of interests among
geographic subdivisions within a state is far less marked than the differences among the states themselves. Moreover, the typical county or township
within a state is more a useful local administrative device than a governmental body having any of the attributes of sovereignty.
' One commentator has concluded that the gerrymandering of legislative
districts "practically adds up to a state-wide system of rotten boroughs".
Neuberger, Our Gerrymandered States, The Nation 127 (Feb. 1, 1941). For
other popular treatments of the subject, see Welsh, Government by Yokel,
3 American Mercury 199 (1924), and Neuberger, Last Stand of Rotten
Boroughs, The Progressive 9 (June 10, 1946). Gerrymanders have, in some
cases, proven so effective that a political party receiving a bare majority or
less of the total vote has been able to elect an entire slate of Congressmen.
See e.g., Short, Congressional Redistricting in Missouri, 25 Am. Pol. Scd.
Rev.,
634-49 (1931).
5
WEasrm's Naw INTRNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2nd Ed.) 1052; ENcYcLoPEDIA BITANNICA, Vol. 10 (1945), 1314.
O This has, of course, led to the formation of such irregularly shaped legislative districts as the Mississippi "shoestring" (which has effectively neutralized Negro and Republican votes by isolating a large portion of those
groups in an area 300 miles long and 20 miles wide) and the Illinois "saddlebag" (composed of groups of counties on opposite sides of the state joined by
a narrow strip of land, which has successfully concentrated many Democratic voters within a single district). Historians report that the word
"gerrymander" is derived from the supposed resemblance of an 1812 Massachusetts district to a salamander. During the administration of Governor
Elbridge Gerry, Jeffersonian Republicans divided the State Senatorial Districts in such a way that, with less than a majority vote, they elected nearly
three-fourths of the members. An artist found that a coastal district in Essex
County could by the addition of wings, teeth and claws be made to resemble
some fabulous monster. "How's that for a salamander?" he said to a
bystander, who retorted, "Better call it a Gerrymander !" See GRrFs'rH,
THE RiSE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER (1907), Chapter I, which
traces the gerrymandering of legislative districts from colonial times
through 1840 and establishes that the device was commonly employed long
prior to 1812.
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Thus, while the former will have small, but supposedly safe,
majorities in a large number of districts, the latter will
control only a few districts in which they are likely to
amass overwhelming pluralities.7 To further assure the
desired result, the districts with a majority of opposition
voters generally contain a larger proportion of the electorate than those which are considered "safe" by the party
in power.' Frequently, this latter device is employed to
secure overrepresentation for rural at the expense of urban
areas within a state.'
Gerrymandering may also result from legislative inaction. In many states reapportionment and redistricting
acts, though equitable at the time of their enactment, may
become highly inequitable due to the shiftings of population. As a result of legislative failure to make periodic
readjustments for such changes in population, all the vices
of a gerrymander soon appear and population disparities
among districts have in many cases become progressively
greater over the years.10
The evils of legislative gerrymandering extend far
beyond individual dilution of voting strength and favoritism of the dominant political machine. For example, per'Of course, when this is employed in any extreme degree, there is always
the very real danger that any appreciable trend toward the opposition party
may well result in the virtual unseating of the party which has contrived
the gerrymander. See RAY, INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PARTIES AND
PRAcrIMAL PoziTics (1924), 462, 487-8; BROOKS, POLITICAL PArIrES AND
PAIaTY PoLITIcs (1933), 473-82.
8 According to the 1950 census figures, in some fifty Congressional districts, members of the House represent about 250,000 constitutents each,
while approximately fifty other representatives speak for 450,000 or more.
In Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and
Texas, the largest district has more than twice the population of the
smallest. See, States Called on to Redistrict for Congress, 40 Nat. Munic.
Rev., 92-3 (1951), and Appendix I to Qolegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549,
557-9 (1946).
OSee Walter, Reapportionment and Urban Representation, 195 Annals
11-20 (1938).
10The largest disparity after the 1950 census was in Illinois where, due to
the legislative failure to validly reapportion Congressional districts since
1901 (inlra, n. 53) the smallest district contained less than 175,000 while
the largest exceeded 900,000. Colegrove v. Green, supra, n. 8. See Mott,
Reapportionment in Illinois, 21 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., 598 (1927), tracing
legislative movements for a new act.
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mitting general overrepresentation of rural-agrarian interests in state legislatures has enabled those groups to
dominate the more populous urban-industrial sections."
The combination of the gerrymander with another political
device -

the party caucus -

may prove so effective that

representatives of a scant portion of the total population
may be able to exert an absolute veto over any proposed
legislation. 2 Gerrymandering of legislative districts also is
reflected in overall party organization. In many states,
apportionment of delegates to state conventions as well as
representation on state committees is based on legislative
districts. Perhaps even more significant is the influence of
the gerrymander upon the process of constitutional amendment. Varying of course with the degree of control exerted
by the legislature over the amending process is the ability
of a gerrymandered legislature to maintain the status quo
by successfully opposing, constitutional reforms
of state
3
apportionment and districting procedures.
II.

STATE LEGisLATIvE

DIsmicTs

A. Constitutional Provisions. Each of the forty-eight

state constitutions contains provisions dealing with the reapportionment and redistricting of state legislative districts. The great majority of them provide that the apportioning agency should be the state legislature. 4 In a few
states, including Arizona, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri and New York, county boards or similar local
u Supra, n. 9.
"In 1950, under the self imposed rule of the Republican Senators in the
New Jersey Senate, no bill or name of a prospective appointee could be
reported to the floor by a committee unless released by affirmative vote of
eleven of the fourteen Republican Senators in a secret caucus. The effect
of the caucus rule was to enable four senators representing counties with
-about three per cent of the total state population to veto any proposed
legislative action. See editorial, Where Caucus is Still King, 39 Nat. Munic.
Rev. 119 (1950).
"BCf. infra, n. 29.
", See, Durfee, Apportionment of Representation in the Legislature; A
Study of State Constitutions, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 1091 (1945), for table at
1104-1112.
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agencies have been delegated 5 or constitutionally empowered 6 to divide counties into legislative districts, after an
apportionment of representatives has been made by the
legislature. In two states, Arkansas and Ohio, boards composed of executive officials perform the apportioning function. 7 Provisions regarding the number of members of
each legislative chamber, the basis of apportionment
(whether by districts, counties, towns, etc.) and the time
prescribed for reapportionment are also set forth with
particularity in almost all state constitutions. 8
A majority of the state constitutions also contain express provisions designed to check the worst forms of gerrymandering. Among these the most common requirements
are that the population of election districts must be equal
(or "as nearly as may be" or "as practicable") and that the
territory forming an election district must be contiguous
and compact. 9 A few state constitutions also contain express provisions authorizing the validity of apportionment
statutes to be tested at the suit of any citizen in an original
proceeding in an appellate court, and directing the court to
5Held to constitute a constitutional delegation of power by the legislature
in Board of Com'rs. v. Jewett, 184 Ind. 63, 110 N. E. 553 (1915).
. .g., ARIZONA CoNsT., Art. IV, Part 2, Sec. 1(1).
17
ARx. CoNsT., Art. VIII, Sec. 1 (Board of Apportionment Commissioners
consisting of the 'Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General) ; OHo
CoNsT., Art. XI, Sec. 11 (Board consisting of Governor, Auditor, and Secretary of State, any two of whom are empowered to act.)
"Durfee, too. cit., supra, n. 14, and Shull, Legislative Apportionment and
the Law, 18 Temple U. L. Q. 388, 397-8 (1944). The constitutions of most
states place a duty on the state legislature to reapportion after each federal
census. A few others merely empower their legislatures to reapportion, but
do not do so in mandatory terms. See e.g., MINN. CONST., Art. IV, Sec. 23.
"In Maryland, these requirements are made applicable to Baltimore City
only by Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution which provides in part that,
"The City of Baltimore shall be divided into six legislative districts as near
as may be of equal population and of contiguous territory, . . ." In states
whose constitutions do not expressly require equality among districts,
equality may nevertheless be implied by the usual requirement that apportionment is to be according to population. But the inclusion of an express
provision that legislative districts should be as nearly equal in population
as practicable may be important due to the fact that some courts have been
more willing to act on the basis of such an express provision. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S. E. 105 (1932). Another less commonly employed provision designed to assure population equality is that
"No county shall have more members of assembly than a county having a
greater number of inhabitants, excluding aliens." N. Y. CONST., Art. III,
Sec. 5.
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give precedence to such a proceeding over all other pending
cases.

20

A few states have also adopted constitutional provisions
expressly designed to overcome the possibility of gerrymandering through legislative inaction. In Florida, the
state constitution provides that should the legislature fail
to act within a stated time, the Governor shall call the legislature into special session, where it is "mandatorily required to reapportion". 2 ' The Constitutions of California,
South Dakota and Texas provide that, upon the failure of
the legislature to act, a special executive board is to reapportion or redistrict the state.2 2 In Arkansas, where the
duty to reapportion is vested in an executive board,23 the
constitution permits any citizen and taxpayer to compel
the board to act by mandamus or otherwise. 24 The Maryland constitution, in allowing the voters to decide every
twenty years whether to have a constitutional convention,
at least opens the door periodically to constitutional re25
districting.
On the other hand, some state constitutional provisions
have the effect of fostering inequality among election districts. For example, such inequalities inevitably result
from the fairly common provision prohibiting the division
of a county in the formation of a legislative district, especi2ARK. CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 5; N. Y. CONST., Art. III, Sec. 5; OKL.
CONST., Art. V, Sec. 10(j). Although the New York and Oklahoma constitutions provide that review shall be subject to such reasonable regulations as
the legislature shall prescribe, cases in both states have held that the courts
might review apportionment acts notwithstanding the failure of the legislature to prescribe regulations. Jones v. Freeman, 193 Oki. 554, 146 P. 2d
564 (1943), app, dis. 322 U. S. 717 (1944); In re Sherril, 188 N. Y. 185,
81 N. E. 124 (1907).
2' FA. CONST., Art. VII, Sec. 3. It is further provided that such session
shall not terminate until a reapportionment is enacted, and shall consider
no other business.
0 CALP. CONST., Art. IV, Sec. 6 (Governor, Attorney-General, Secretary of
State, Superintendent of Public Instruction) ; S. D. CoNsT., Art. III, Sec. 5
(Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney-General, Superintendent of Public
Instruction, Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court). TExAs CONST., Art.
III, Sec. 28, discussed in McClain, Compulsory Reapportionment, 40 Nat.
Munic. Rev., 305-7, 324 (1951).
2Supra, n. 17.
2, Ibid, Art. VIII, Sec. 5.

Infra, n. 29.
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ally when it is also provided that each county shall elect a
minimum number of representatives. 2 Another somewhat
less common provision producing inequalities among districts is that which provides for apportionment of representatives in one or both houses of the state legislature
according to constitutionality fixed progressive ratios of
27
population.
Perhaps the most striking form of potential "constitutional gerrymandering" is illustrated by Article III, Section
5 of the Maryland Constitution which fixes the number of
legislators to represent each county in the House of Delegates.2 s Since no provision is made for any reapportionment to meet future population changes among counties,
the only means for reapportioning representatives is
through the cumbersome process of constitutional amendment. 29 Although the Constitution likewise allots a fixed
number of delegates to represent each of the legislative
districts in Baltimore City, the General Assembly is expressly empowered to equalize future population disparities
among the City's districts by changing the boundaries of
such districts from time to time."0
See, e.g., N. C. CONST., Art. II, Sec. 5.
In Maine, for example, Senatorial Districts are to be apportioned as
follows: Each county having a population of 30,000 or less is to have one
Senator; each county. having from 30,000 to 60,000 is to have two Senators;
each county having from 60,000 to 120,000 is to have three Senators; while
each county having from 120,000 to 240,000 is to have four Senators; and
any county having more than that is apportioned five Senators. ME. CONST.,
Art. IV, Part 2nd, Sec. 1.
"The Delaware Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 2) similarly apportions members of the state legislature.
21The Maryland Constitution (Art. XIV, Sec. 2; Art. XVII, Sec. 9)
provides that, once every twenty years, the voters shall decide whether or
not to call a constitutional convention. If approved, the General Assembly
is to call a convention for the purpose of amending the Constitution,
provided no such amendments shall become effective until approved by
the voters. The electorate in November 1950 voted in favor of calling a
convention by an overwhelming plurality, but the Assembly failed to
call a convention, due (according to editorial criticism at the time) to
the fact that the smaller counties feared that the convention would reapportion the House of Representatives and thereby give control of the House
to the more populous counties and Baltimore City. Editorials, Baltimore
Sun, December 12, 1950, p. 16; December 23, 1950, p. 10.
81Art. III, Sec. 4:
I"... the General Assembly shall have power to provide by law, from
time to time, for altering and changing 'the boundaries of the existing
legislative districts of the City of Baltimore, so as to make them as
near as may be of equal population; but said districts shall always
consist of contiguous territory."
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B. JudicialReview of Legislative Enactments. Although
it is sometimes contended that state legislative reapportionment and redistricting acts are political matters beyond
the scope of judicial review, it is now universally recognized
that the validity of such enactments is a proper subject
for judicial inquiry." In the infrequent instances where a
mandatory requirement of a state constitution has been
violated in establishing districts or apportioning representatives, the courts have shown no hesitancy in granting
relief.2 However, in the great majority of cases where
legislative acts have been challenged because of alleged
nonconformity to those constitutional standards which can
never be absolutely and exactly attained, such as compactness, contiguity and equality of population, the courts have
traditionally been reluctant to substitute their judgment
for that of the legislature.3 In case after case involving
asserted population disparities among districts, the courts
have consistently refused to set aside apportionment acts
unless the inequalities among districts were so gross
10Cases collected in annotation: Inequality of Population or Lack of
Compactness of Territory as Invalidating Apportionment of Representatives, 2 A. L. R. 1337, 1339, and Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37
Harv. L. Rev. 338, 358 (1924). For works discussing the history of apportionment acts in individual states, see: FAumzv, LmISLATIVE PROCESS IN
ALABA MA (1949), 20-43; Ahl, Reapportionment in California, 22 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev., 977-80 (1928) ; Mott, Reapportionment in Illinois, 21 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev., 598-602 (1927) ; Stewart, A Study of Gerrymanderingin Kentucky, 22
Ky. L. J. 417, 426 (1934); Apportionment of the New York State A8embly,
29 St. John's L. Rev. 345 (1955) ; Korsak and Di Salle, Legislative Apportionment in Pennsylvania,12 U. of Pitt. L. Rev., 215, 222-43 (1951) ; Collins
and MacGregor, Recent Developments in the Legislative Redistricting
Struggle in Wisconsin, 1955 Wis. L. Rev., 125-39.
10Adams v. Forsythe, 44 La. Ann. 130, 10 So. 622 (1892) [holding invalid
an act increasing the total number of representatives beyond the maximum
fixed by the constitution] ; State v. Bricker, 139 Oh. St. 499, 41 N. E. 2d 377
(1942) [setting aside an act which divided former state senatorial districts
into two or more new districts although the newly created districts had less
than the requisite three-fourths senatorial ratio] ; Morris v. Wrightson, 56
N. J. L. 126, 28 A. 56 (1893) [invalidating an act dividing counties into
assembly districts and providing that the residents of each district might
vote for only one assemblyman where the constitution provided that the
assemblymen representing each county should be elected by all the voters
residing in the county].
See cases cited in Annotation cited, aupra, n. 31. The overwhelming
majority of the cases have involved alleged inequalities in population among
districts. Only a few have involved the requirements of compactness and
contiguity: People v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N. E. 307 (1895) ; In re
Dowling, 219 N. Y. 113 N. E. 545 (1916).
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as to show an almost total disregard of constitutional
limitations. 4
Various reasons have been assigned for the judicial
recognition of a wide latitude of legislative discretion. The
courts have, in general, recognized that it is virtually impossible to observe county, or other constitutionally prescribed geographic units, and obtain districts approximately
equal in population.2 5 Furthermore, in redistricting a state,
the apportioning body is assumed to be thoroughly familiar
with the territory, including its cities and towns, its topography and means of communication. 6 In addition, the
courts have been traditionally reluctant to question the
motives or alleged lack of wisdom of the legislature, it being
quite frequently stated that it is virtually impossible to
enact any new apportionment or revision of legislative districts which is not the subject of adverse criticism and of
alleged possible improvement.
Finally, there is a tacit
"The following chart lists comparative population figures where legislative reapportionment acts have been invalidated. (The unit of representation is the population of the theoretically perfect district.)
STATE APPORTIONMENT AcTS HE D INVALID

Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141,
100 S. W. 865
Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799,
40 S. W. 2d 315 (1931)..........
State v. Cunningham, 81 Wisc. 440,
2
51 N. W. 724
State v. Cunningham, 83 WIsc. 90,
53 N. W. 35 (1892)......
People v. Board of Sup'rs., 138
N. Y. 95, 33 N. E. 827 (1893).....
Rogers v. Morgan, 127 Neb. 456,
256 N. W. 1 (1934) ...................
Brooks v. State, 162 Ind. 568, 70
N. E. 980 (1904)
Attorney General v. Suffolk Co.
Apportionment Commissioners,
224 Mass. 598, 113 N. E. 581
Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1,
52 N. W. 944 (1892)_..... ..... ......
Williams v. Secretary of State, 145
Mich. 447, 108 N. W. 749 (1906)

Representation

Unit Of

Largest
District

Rmallest
District

21,471

53,263

7,047

65,000

128,595

39,210

51,117

65,952

30,732

51,117

68,601

38,690

55,237

102,805

31,685

13,779

21,181

8,094

10,787

13,886

6,943

3,258

6,812

1,957

65,434

91,420

39,727

73,063

116,033

52,000

State v. Dammann, 209 Wisc. 21, 243 N. W. 481 (1932).
People v. Board of Sup'rs., 148 N. Y. 187, 42 N. E. 592 (1896).
" People v. Rice, 135 N. Y. 473, 31 N. E. 921 (1892) ; Adams v. Bosworth,
126 Ky. 61, 102 S. W. 861 (1907) [relief denied where a declaration of invalidity would "discourage and disorganize" governmental practices long
followed and in which there had been general acquiesence.]
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judicial recognition of the political "give and take" involved
in the enactment of any reapportionment or redistricting
statute.38
C. Judicial Review of Action by Executive Boards. In
Missouri, where the duty to redistrict is vested in a board
composed of executive officials rather than the legislature,
the state supreme court, in a recent decision" invalidating
a redistricting undertaken by the board, stated that the
actions of such officials would be scrutinized more closely,
and that they would be permitted far less latitude for the
exercise of discretion, than the legislature. In Arkansas,
where the state supreme court is constitutionally empowered to "revise any arbitrary action or abuse of discretion"
of the apportionment board,4" the court showed no hesitancy
in substituting its judgment for that of the board by not
only invalidating the board's action, but also prescribing
an entirely new reapportionment of state election districts.41
D. Capacity to Raise the Constitutional Issue. Almost
all the cases questioning the validity of state acts have been
instituted by a petitioner acting in the capacity of a taxpayer and voter who has sought by injunction or mandamus
to restrain a state official from performing duties (such
as preparing and furnishing ballots) under the allegedly
unconstitutional act and to compel the performance of such
duties under a prior and allegedly valid act.42 It is well
The following extract from People v. Rice, ibid, 929-930, is illustrative
of a fairly typical judicial attitude:
"Local pride, commercial jealousies and rivalries, diverse interests
among the people, together with a difference of views as to the true
interests of the localities to be affected, all these things and many others
might have weight among the representatives upon the question of
apportionment, so that, in order to accomplish any result at all, compromise and conciliation would have to be exercised. Looking at the
act as a result of such circumstances, and (sio) it seems clear that it
cannot be said to be so far a violation of legislative discretion as to
cause its complete overthrow by the courts."
2 Preisler v. Doherty, 284 S. W. 2d 427 (Mo. 1955), action for declaratory
judgment.
10ARK. CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 5.
" Pickens v. Board of Apportionment, 220 Ark. 145, 246 S. W. 2d 556
(1952).
12At least one case has held that any state citizen over twenty-one years
of age at the time of the last preceding census has standing to sue. Brooks
v. State, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N. E. 980 (1904). And, although a minority of
the cases take a contrary view, it has been held that it is not necessary
to first make application to a state official for the relief sought before
bringing the action. Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N. W. 944 (1892).
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settled that one does not have to be a candidate for office to
bring such an action,4" or reside in a district which is unconstitutionally discriminated against by being allotted a
disproportionately small representation in the legislature."
E. Consequences of Invalidity. Except where expressly
empowered to do so by constitutional provision, 5 the courts
have consistently disclaimed any right in themselves to
either redistrict or reapportion or to suggest a valid method
of performing such functions. 6 Consequently, the effect of
declaring a reapportionment or restricting act invalid is to
revive the last prior constitutional act. Some courts have
explained this result on the ground that the declaration of
unconstitutionality includes that part of the more recent
act repealing the prior statute."1 Others have reached the
same result by holding that such an act, if valid when enacted, remains in force until supplanted by a subsequent
valid act.48 In either case, the legislature elected under the
unconstitutional act is recognized as a de facto (and in some
cases, a de jure) body whose legislative acts cannot be
collaterally attacked.49
Sometimes the effect of invalidating a statutory gerrymander and thereby reviving an earlier act will be to cause
greater inequalities among districts than those existing
under the act sought to be set aside. Under such circumstances, all relief will be denied where the prior act was
also grossly inequitable when enacted; 0 where, on the other
hand, the prior act, though fair at the time of its enactment,
no longer reflects current population ratios among districts,
"Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S. W. 2d 315 (1931).
"Brooks v. State, aupra, n. 42. The denial of fair representation to other
state districts is recognized as being just as injurious to the political rights
of the petitioner as if the inequalities complained of existed in his own
district.
" Supra, ns. 40-41.
"To do so would constitute a usurpation of legislative power: State v.
Stoddard, 25 Nev. 452, 62 P. 237 (1900) ; Fesler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71,
44 N. E. 37 (1896) ; Sullivan v. Schnitger, 16 Wyo. 479, 95 P. 698 (1908).
"Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Col. 425, 37 P. 2d 757 (1934).
"Williams v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich. 447, 108 N. W. 749 (1906).
"Were this not so, it would, of course, be impossible for the current legislature to validly perform its constitutional duty ,to enact a valid reapportionment or redistricting statute. People v. Board of Canvassers, 129 N. Y.
360, 29 N. E. 345 (1891) ; People v. Board of Sup'rs, 138 N. Y. 95, 33 N. E.
827 (1893).
80Denney v. State, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N. E. 929 (1896).
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there is a conflict of authority as to whether relief should
be granted.5 '
F. Efforts to Compel Legislative Action. There appears
to be no effective judicial remedy to combat those gerrymanders which have arisen due to the protracted failure on
the part of about one-half of the state legislatures to enact
new reapportionment or redistricting acts at the times
specified by their state constitutions. 2 The most flagrant
"passive" gerrymander and the one giving rise to the
greatest number of attempts to secure judicial intervention - all of which have met with the same result resulted from the failure of the Illinois legislature to validly
reapportion members of the state General Assembly among
legislative districts after 1901, although constitutionally
required to do so after each federal census.5 In 1926, after
the legislature had twice failed to perform its constitutional
mandate, an action was brought in which a writ of mandamus was sought to compel the members of the General
Assembly to meet and reapportion legislative districts.5 4
The Illinois Supreme Court in Fergus v. Marks,5 5 held that
the constitutional provision in question, although concededly mandatory in nature, was judicially nonenforceable,
Williams v. Secretary of State, supra, n. 48 (greater inequalities of
prior act held not to constitute a bar) ; Contra: Jones v. Freeman, 193 Oki.
554, 146 P. 2d 564 (1943), app. di8. 322 U. S. 717 (1944).
0 The results of a survey conducted in 1941 (Shull, Reapportionment: A
Chronio Problem, 30 Nat. Munic. Rev. 73, 77-8) revealed that only about
fifty per cent of the states might be classified as having an up to date
apportionment within the preceding ten years. The last prior apportionment in eight states had taken place from 1920 to 1925. In four states, the
last apportionment had been between 1901 and 1917, and two states had not
reapportioned since 1893.
' Art. IV, Sec. 6 of the Illinois Constitution of 1870. In People v. Carlock,
198 Ill. 150, 65 N. E. 109 (1902), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
the districts created by the 1901 Act [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. (1944 Rev.,
Vol. 1), Sees. 43.150-43.156] were not so grossly unequal in population as to constitute an abuse of legislative discretion. See supra, n. 10,
with regard to the extent of inequalities among districts after the 1950
census. A redistricting statute was enacted in 1931, but was invalidated in
Moran v. Bowley, 347 Il1. 148, 179 N. H. 526 (1932), because of the inequalities among the districts it established.
5, See note, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 137 (1926), pointing out that Fergus v.
Marks, infra, n. 55, was the first case in this country in which the question
of a mandamus to the legislature had arisen.
-321 Ill. 510, 152 N. E. 557 (1926).
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the legislature being solely accountable to the people for
its failure to perform.56
Other attempts down through the years have likewise
proven unavailing. Thus, in Fergus v. Kinney,5 7 the same
petitioner brought suit to enjoin the State Treasurer from
paying the salaries and expenses of the members of the
legislature on the ground that the failure to reapportion
prevented the legislature from being a legally constituted
body. Once again relief was denied, the Court stating that
it would not do indirectly what it had previously declined
to do directly.5 8 In People v. Blackwell,5 9 the Court similarly refused to question the legality of legislative authority
on quo warrantodirected to the members of the legislature.
In People v. Clardy,60 the court summarily rejected the
contention that a criminal conviction should be set aside
because the legislature which enacted the statute under
which the conviction was obtained had not been legally
elected due to the failure to reapportion."1 In Keogh v.
Neely, 2 an attempt was made to restrain the United States
Collector of Internal Revenue from collecting federal income taxes in Illinois, it being claimed among other things,
that due to the failure of the federal government to compel
the Illinois legislature to reapportion, it had denied to the
people of Illinois the constitutional guaranty of a republican
mAccord: State v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 101, 23 N. W. 2d 610 (1946);
In re State Census, 6 S. D. 540, 62 N. W. 129 (1895), advisory opinion. It
has for the same reason been held in two cases that mandamus will not lie
against a state official to compel him to prepare ballots and conduct an
election as if an equitable apportionment were in effect when the state
legislature has failed to perform its constitutional duty. Latting v. Cordell,
197 Oki. 369, 172 P. 2d 397 (1946) ; Burns v. Flynn, 155 Misc. 742, 281
N. Y. S. 494, 497 (1935), affd. 268 N. Y. 601, 198 N. E. 424 (1935).
- 333 Ill. 437, 164 N. E. 665 (1928).
aIbid. In Morrow v. City of Cleveland, 72 Oh. App. 460, 56 N. E. 2d 333
(1943), the court refused to enjoin the payment of the salaries of the members of the City Council holding that the failure of the Council to redivide
the city into wards in accordance with a city charter provision did not
invalidate the Council offices in view of a charter provision continuing
existing wards until new ones were established. The Court also said that
even without such a charter provision, the issue was a purely political one
in which the Court should not interfere.
-342 Ill. 223, 173 N. E. 750 (1930).
-334 Ill. 160, 165 N. E. 638 (1929).
01Accord: Leonard v. Maxwell, 216 N. C. 89, 3 S. E. 2d 316 (1939),
validity of State Sales Tax assailed for the same reason.
"50 F. 2d 685 (7th Cir., 1931), cert. den. 284 U. S. 583 (1931).
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form of government 63 thereby relieving Illinois citizens
from the payment of federal income taxes. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held the contention to be without merit, stating that even assuming that
the federal government could require the Illinois legislature
to obey the state constitution, failure to do so would not
relieve its citizens of the burdens imposed upon them by
the federal Constitution."4
In two other states, indirect attempts have been made
to compel legislative action by seeking judicial invalidation
of existing apportionment statutes on the ground that the
failure of the state legislatures to reapportion had resulted
in such inequalities in population among districts as to
make the acts in question unconstitutional at the time of
suit, although they may have been valid when enacted.
In both instances, the courts have disclaimed the power to
grant relief, on the basis that the legislature bore sole responsibility for obeying the constitutional mandate, and
that the proper province of the judiciary was limited to
determining the legality of legislative acts when enacted.6 5
G. Compelling Action by Executive Officials. The reasons for refusing to intercede where the legislature is involved have been held not to exist in those states where the
responsibility to reapportion or redistrict has been entrusted to administrative officials. If such officials fail to
act within the required time, mandamus has issued directing them to do so.6 Mandamus has likewise been granted
in a majority of the decided cases to require the subdivision
of counties into new election districts by local administrative boards charged with such duties, even though the function of apportioning representatives among each of the
U; S. CoNsT., Art. IV, Sec. 4.
"For cases involving the gerrymandering of Illinois Congre8ssonal districts, see infra, ns. 80-93. The Illinois legislature finally passed a redistricting act in 1955, which was held valid in Donovan v. Holzman, 8 Ill. 2d
87, 132 N. E. 2d 501 (1956).
6 Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn. 486, 19 N. W. 2d 914 (1945) ; State v. Howell,
92 Wash. 540, 159 P. 777 (1916). See dicta to the same effect in State v.
Zimmerman, 8upra, n. 56.
a Smith v. Board of Apportionment, 219 Ark. 611, 243 S. W. 2d 755 (1951),
State v. Bricker, 139 Oh. St. 499, 41 N. E. 2d 377 (1942).
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and hence is not subject
counties remains in the legislature
67
to judicial compulsion.
III.

GERRYMANDERING

OF FEEm

AL CONGRESSIONAL

Disnucrs
A. ConstitutionalProvisions. Two sections of the Federal Constitution relate to the apportionment of members
of the House of Representatives. Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that Representatives should
be apportioned among the States according to population,
excluding untaxed Indians, and the third paragraph of
Article One, Section Two provides for a reapportionment
of Representatives every ten years in such manner as Congress shall direct.""
Authority for Congress to prescribe the method of redistricting to be observed within the states for Congressional elections is contained in the first paragraph of
Article One, Section Four of the Constitution which provides that, "The Times, Places, and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be pre,"Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs., 224 Mass.
598, 113 N. E. 581 (1916). [The court stated that mandamus was appropriate to set aside the illegal performance of duty and to compel performance when there is a corresponding duty to act. Although not referred to
by the court, there is a Massachusetts Statute which would seem to specifically authorize mandamus in such a case. Mass. Ann. Law, Ch. 56, Sec.
59] ; Baird v. King's County, 138 N. Y. 95, 38 N. E. 827 (1893). CI. Board
of Sup'rs. of Marlcopa County v. Pratt, 47 Ariz. 536, 57 P. 2d 1220 (1936)
and Carpenter v. Board of Apportionment, 218 Ark. 404, 236 S. W. 2d 582
(1951), in both of which mandamus was denied because the Court found no
duty to redistrict at the time suit was brought, without discussing whether
the board was subject to mandamus. Contra: State v. Hitchkock, 241 Mo.
433, 146 S. W. 40 (1912) [holding that such a board was for this purpose
a "minature legislature" and therefore not amenable to mandamus.]
" Under the present reapportionment statute [46 Stat. 26 (1929), as
amended 54 Stat. 162 (1940) and 55 Stat. 761 (1941) ; 2 U. S. C. A. Sec. 2a
(1956 Supp.)] the President, after each decennial census, submits a statement to Congress showing the population of each state and the number of
representatives to which it is entitled. The mathematical formula of apportionment now prescribed is the "equal proportion" method. See Chafee,
CongressionalReapportionment, 42 H'arv. L. Rev. 1015 (1929). The present
act, passed in 1929, is designed to avoid deadlocks between the Senate and
House, such as the one which occurred after the 1920 census when Congress
failed to enact a new apportionment. Although no direct attempt was made
to compel Congress to reapportion, the view has often been expressed that
the courts are powerless to intervene. Chafee, ibid; Colegrove v. Green,
328 U. S. 549, 555 (1946). The question was raised indirectly in a state
court and answered in the negative. State v. Boyd, 36 Neb. 181, 54 N. W.
252 (1893).

292

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

scribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations except as to the Places of choosing Senators."6' 9
B. Absence of FederalStatutory Regulation. By means
of successive apportionment statutes enacted approximately
every ten years from 1842 until 1911, Congress provided
that in each state entitled to more than one member, the
state's representatives "shall be elected by districts composed of a contiguous and compact territory and containing
as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants".7"
After the census of 1920, the two Houses of Congress were
unable to reach agreement on a new reapportionment
statute and it was not until 1929 that a new statute was
passed. The 1929 Act 7 contained no requirements of contiguity, compactness or approximate equality of population,
nor did it contain a provision expressly repealing the
1911 Act. 2
In Wood v. Broom," a suit challenging an alleged gerrymander of Mississippi Congressional districts prior to the
1932 elections, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written
by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, held that the requirements of
compactness, contiguity and approximate equality of population had "expired by their own limitations".7 4 The Court
viewed the legislative history of the 1929 Act as showing
a deliberate Congressional intent to omit the safeguards of
the Act of 1911. Although the District Court in which the
"There is nothing in the Federal Constitution which requires that Con-

gressmen representing states apportioned more than one representative be
elected from geographically distinct Congressional districts. Although Congress has at various times enacted legislation requiring election by single
member districts, the current Apportionment Act, ibid, contains no such
requirement. Two states (New Mexico and North Dakota) elect their two
members of the House at large, while two others (Washington and Connecticut) have districts, but also elect one at large member. All of the
other states, including Maryland, elect representatives from single member
districts. Md. Code (1951), Art. 33, Secs. 129-136, sets forth the composition
of Maryland's seven Congressional districts.
" 0The 1911 Act was 37 Stat. 14, 2 U. S. C. A. 3.
1Supra, n. 68.
"The repeal provision in -the 1929 Act was the "blanket" type repealing
all other laws and parts of laws inconsistent with it.
1287 U. S. 1 (1932).
'Three state courts had previously held that the requirements of the
1911 Act were still in effect. Moran v. Bowley, 347 Ill. 148, 179 N. E. 526
(1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 258 N. Y. 292, 179 N. E. 705 (1932); Brown v.
Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S. E. 105 (1932).
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suit had been brought had found that the challenged districts were neither compact, contiguous, nor approximately
equal in population,7 5 the Court refused, in the absence of
any federal statutory regulations, to declare the act invalid.
Four Justices" concurred in the result on the separate
ground that the bill should have been dismissed for want
7

of equity."

Although efforts have been made at various times since
the Wood decision to reimpose the standards set forth in
the 1911 Act, or to provide other statutory safeguards to
check Congressional gerrymandering, s none has met with
success.
C. Failure of Attacks Based on Federal Constitutional
Provisions.The flagrant Illinois gerrymander, which figured
prominently in litigation involving the gerrymandering of
state legislative districts,7 9 was also responsible for the first
constitutional attack upon the gerrymandering of federal
Congressional districts to reach the Supreme Court. 0 In
" Broom v. Wood, 1 F. Supp. 134 (S. D. Miss., 1932).
Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone, Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr.
Justice Cardozo.
" They pointed out that the lower court and all of the parties had assumed
that the 1911 Act was still in effect. The majority expressly declined passing
upon the justiciability of the controversy.
'aIn 1939, a Bill (H. 5099, 76th Cong.) was introduced which provided
that, if the population of the largest district exceeded that of the smallest
by more than fifty per cent, all representatives from the state should be
elected at large until new districts in conformity with the statutory requirements were established. On January 9, 1951, upon submitting the new
reapportionment of Representatives, President Truman, in a special message
to Congress urged the reenactment of the standards contained in the 1911
Act, and also suggested that Congress provide by statute for some maximum
deviation in population among districts. New York Times, January 10,
1951, page 22. Two bills were subsequently introduced in the Eighty-second
Congress to accomplish these objects. The first (H. 2648) provided for a
maximum variation in population among state districts of 15% above or
below the number obtained by dividing the state's total population by the
number of representatives apportioned to it; any Congressmen elected from
a district which did not conform to this standard would be denied his seat.
The second (H. 6165) provided that in any case or controversy arising
under the Apportionment Act, "it shall not be a defense or a jurisdictional
objection that the issues are of a political nature".
" Supra, no. 53-64.
0The same districts from which members of the state legislature were
elected were also used for Congressional elections. In Daly v. Madison
County, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N. E. 2d 160 (1941), the Supreme Oourt of Illinois,
relying on Wood v. Broom, 8upra, n. 73, held that there were no federal
statutory or constitutional restrictions upon Congressional districting. (The
federal constitutional issue was not, however, decided in the Wood case. It
was not raised by the petitioners who had assumed that the 1911 Apportionment Act requirement of approximate equality in population was still
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Colegrove v. Green,8 suit was brought under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act 2 to enjoin Illinois officials from
proceeding with the 1946 Congressional elections under the
1901 Illinois Act.8 The case produced a three-way split
among the seven justices" who heard it. Three Justices 5
thought the case might be disposed of on the same grounds
as Wood v. Broom. The Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act, not available at the time of the Wood case, was deemed
by them to be merely a new procedural device which did
not enlarge the scope of equitable relief which federal
courts were empowerd to grant. These three Justices also
agreed with the minority in the Wood case who thought
that the bill should have been dismissed for want of equity.
The suit was moreover thought by them to involve no private wrong, but merely a "wrong suffered by Illinois as a
polity".8 " The question was deemed political inasmuch as
the Constitution was viewed as having granted to Congress
exclusive authority over the subject matter of the suit.
A fourth Justice 8 concurred in the dismissal of the suit,
on the ground that the Court should not as a matter of discretion grant relief, although, he viewed the issue raised by
the petition as being justiciable in equity.
The remaining three Justices 9 dissented, taking the
position that the question was justiciable and that the appellants had suffered personal harm entitling them to equitable
intervention. The effect of the 1901 Illinois Act was considered by them to work a denial to the appellants of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was also deemed to constitute a violation
applicable.) The court also held that, if the 1901 Illinois Apportionment Act,
was valid when enacted, It could not become invalid due to subsequent
events.
1
328 U. S. 549 (1946).
-28 U. S. C. A. 2201 (1950).
0 Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. (1944 Rev. Vol.), Secs. 43.150-43.156.
91Chief Justice Stone died before the case was decided, and Justice
Jackson did not participate.
"Justices Frankfurter, Reed and Burton.
Supra, n. 73.
S7Supra, n. 81, 552.
"Justice Rutledge.
"Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy.
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of the privileges and immunities clause in abridging appellants' privilege as citizens to vote for Congressmen under
Article I of the Constitution.
Thus, a majority of the Court (composed of the three
dissenters and the concurring justice) were of the opinion
that the issue was one where equity properly might assume
jurisdiction. Moreover, the same majority felt that the
Wood case was not determinative of the constitutional
issues. The Court's dismissal of the action is therefore
attributable to the view of one Justice that under the circurnstances equity should not exercise jurisdiction.9 '
In Colegrove v. Barrett,2 the same petitioner brought
suit to enjoin all future Congressional elections in Illinois
under the 1901 Act instead of the one election sought to be
enjoined in Colegrove v. Green.98 The Supreme Court, dismissed the appeal "for want of a substantial federal question". The same three Justices who had dissented in the
0 Petitions for rehearing and for reargument were denied by the same
seven Justices who had heard the case. 329 U. S. 825, 828 (1946).
In Remmey v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708, 710 (opinion, fn. 11) (E. D. Pa.,
1951), app. dis. 342 U. S. 916 (1952), Judge Biggs observed that "The language employed (in the Colegrove case) would seem to indicate that the
questions presented related to the exercise of judicial power rather than
to the possession of the power to adjudicate." (Parenthetical material
supplied.)
O330 U. S. 804 (1947).
" The effort to enjoin all future elections was obviously designed to
obviate the opinion expressed by Justice Rutledge in his concurring opinion
in Colegrove v. Green, that due to the shortness of time before the 1946
elections, the granting of relief in that case might result in more harm than
good by forcing an at large election. [328 U. S. 549, 565-6 (1946)]. It was
perhaps also thought that either Chief Justice Vinson, who had been
recently appointed, or Justice Jackson, who did not participate in Colegrove
v. Green, or both of them, would take the side of the dissenters in that case.
However, in Colegrove v. Barrett, ibid, neither of these Justices voted to
note probable jurisdiction and Justice Rutledge concurred in the dismissal
of the petition "[I]n view of the Court's refusal to grant rehearing in
Colegrove v. Green... and its dismissal of the appeals in Cook v. Forteon
and Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U. S. 675 . . ." These latter two [68 F. Supp.
624 (N. D. Ga., 1946) and 68 F. Supp. 744 (N. D. Ga., 1946)] were actions
seeking to enjoin the use of the Georgia county unit vote rule in federal as
well as state elections on the ground that the unit vote system constituted
a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On a consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed both, citing United
States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U. S. 812 (1929), a case involving Supreme
Court procedure for the dismissal of appeals involving moot issues. In the
note, Injunctive Protection of Political Rights in the Federal Courts, 62
Harv. L. Rev. 659, 662 (1949), fn. 26, it is stated that the Cook and Turman
appeals were probably denied because the election had already been held,
suggesting this as d reason for Colegrove's second suit to enjoin future
elections.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

first case were of the opinion that probable jurisdiction
should have been noted.
Although roundly criticized, 94 the Colegrove doctrine of
judicial non-intervention in gerrymandering disputes was
followed and extended to other related fields in two subsequent cases coming before the court during the 1948 and
1950 election campaigns. In MacDougall v. Green,9 5 the
Progressive Party sought to enjoin the operation of a 1935
Illinois statute requiring petitions to form and nominate
candidates for new political parties to be signed by at least
25,000 voters including 200 from each of 50 of the state's
102 counties. Because of the grossly uneven distribution
of population among counties, it was contended that the
statute worked a denial of equal protection of the laws by
allowing less populous counties to prevent the formation of
a new party. The Supreme Court, in a Per Curiam opinion
denying relief, stated:
"To assume that political power is a function exclusively of numbers is to disregard the practicalities of
government... It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for this Court, applying such broad constitutional concepts as due process and equal protection of
the laws, to deny a State the power to assure a proper
diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly
populated counties and those having concentrated
masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical
opportunities for exerting their political weight at the
polls not available to the former. The Constitution a practical instrument of government - makes no such
demands on the States."96
In South v. Peters,9 decided in 1950, an attempt was
made to enjoin the operation in a primary election of the
9' See note, Injunctive Protectionof Political Rights in the FederalCourts,
ibid; Note, ConstitutionalRight to CongressionalDistricts of Equal Population, 56 Yale L. J. 127 (1946) ; Burdette, The Illinois CongressionalRedistricting Case, 40 Am. Pol. Scl. Rev., 958 (1946).
335 U. S. 281 (1948).
"Ibid, 283-4. Five members of the Court voted to affirm the Lower Court
which had dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. Justice Rutledge
again concurred because of the shortness of time before the election.
Justices Douglas, Black and Murphy once again dissented.
M339 U. S. 276 (1950).
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Georgia "county unit vote" statute,"' which combined with
gross population disparities among counties, resulted in the
votes of residents of the most populous Georgia county
receiving approximately one-eleventh the weight of the
average votes of residents of other counties. In a two paragraph Per Curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of the petition by the lower court, and stated
flatly that "Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise
their equity powers in cases posing political issues arising
from a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength
among its political subdivisions"."
Recently, however, a case arose in the United States District Court for Hawaii, which may mark a reversal of the
prior judicial trend. In a lengthy opinion delivered in
February, 1956, Chief Judge McLaughlin, speaking for the
court in Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe,' ° denied a motion to dismiss a complaint by a territorial voter to compel the Hawaii
legislature to reapportion representatives. The court did
not consider itself bound by the Colegrove cases inasmuch
as no state-federal relationship was involved. Even if this
were not so, the court stated that, in view of several precedent shattering Supreme Court decisions in recent years
invalidating any discriminations based upon race, creed or
color even though countenanced by state law,10 the time
9 The statute awarded all of a county's unit votes (ranging from two to
six among counties) to the candidate receiving the largest popular vote in
the county.
9 Supra, n. 97, 277. The MacDougall, Colegrove and Wood decisions were
cited. Justices Douglas and Black dissented. Other federal cases in related
fields have followed the lead of the Colegrove cases in classifying election
matters as political: Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377, 380
(1948) ; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 570 (1946) ; Caven
v. Clark, 78 F. Supp. 295 (W. D. Ark., 1948) ; Cook v. Fortson, supra, n. 93.
See also Dennis v. United States, 171 F. 2d 986 (D. C. Cir., 1948), affd. 339
U. S. 162 (1950), reh. den. 339 U. S. 950 (1950), a criminal prosecution for
failure to respond to a subpoena of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities; and Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F. 2d 235 (4th Cir., 1945), cert. den.
328 U. S. 870 (1946), a suit for damages against the Secretary of State of
Virginia for failure to certify plaintiff's candidacy for Congress. In both
cases, it was asserted 'that state poll taxes violated the Fourteenth Amendment by abridging the rights of citizens to vote. In the Dennis case, this
issue was raised in the lower court, it being contended that the Chairman
of the House Committee had not been constitutionally elected.
10
138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii, 1956).
Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953) [striking down restrictions on
negro voting in Texas] ; Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S.
483 (1954) [outlawing school segregation].
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had come when the judiciary should not refuse to intervene
where the discrimination complained of was based upon
an inequitable arrangement of election districts.
D. Right of the House of Representatives to Exclude
Member Elected From Gerrymandered District. The Constitution provides that "Each house shall be the Judge of
'1 2
the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its Members.
Acting under this authority, Congress has upon two occasions investigated elections which have been challenged
because of alleged gerrymanders of election districts in the
state in which the challenged member was elected."'
Despite the fact that, in one of the cases,1 °1 a majority of
the House Committee which conducted the investigation
found that the state redistricting statute in question was
contrary to the requirements of contiguity, compactness
and approximate equality of population contained in the
Apportionment Act of 190115 and recommended that the
challenge be upheld, the House refused in both cases to
exclude the challenged member.
Although the opinion of the court in the first Colegrove
case strongly suggested that the House of Representatives
itself (even in the absence of such statutory standards as
were contained in the 1901 Act) has power to exclude a
member elected from a gerrymanded state,0 ' the prospect
of successfully challenging a Congressional election on this
basis, appears to be highly improbable. The Houses of
Congress have been traditionally reluctant to exercise their
power to exclude the candidate who is certified by the state
as its duly elected representative. To do so in a case where
Art. I, Sec. 5, Part 1.
Davidson v. ,Gilbert, reported in PowEUL, DIGEST OF CONTESTED ELECTION
CASES (1910) 603-5, and Parsons v. Saunders, reported in MOORE, DIGEST OF
CONTESTED ELECTION CASES (1917) 43.
10 Parsons v. Saunders, ibid.
The Supreme Court has held that there are no such requirements in the
present Act, supra, n. 68, discussed aupra, ns. 70-78.
328 U. S. 549, 554, 556 (1946) :
"The short of it is that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress
exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States in the
popular House and left to that House determination whether States
'

have fulfilled their re8ponsibility.
*

*

.

*

*

*

"The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of
Congress." (Italics supplied.)
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"

the challenge was based upon a charge of gerrymandering
would be setting a precedentwhich conceivably might lead
to election contests from a majority -of the states. Even if
the power were exercised, it is likely that the Congressmen
would. vote on a purely partisan basis. Moreover, in gerrymandering, contests there is the further practical difficulty
that, unlike the ordinary contested election, a valid .federal
election could not be held until such time as the legislature
had acted -to correct the deficiencies in its districting
arrangement.
E. Congressional Power to Redistrict Gerrymandered
States. The doubts once expressed as to whether Congress
possessed constitutional authority to require that Congressional districts conform to certain general standards, °7 such
as those embodied in the Apportionment Act of 1911,108 have
now been dispelled.0 9 While Congress has never attempted
to go further and actually redistrict a state, the Supreme
Court has frequently said that under Article I, Section 4
of the Constitution, Congress exercises "a general supervisory power over the whole subject" of Congressional
elections,"10 such as to empower it to enact legislation "of
the same general character that the legislature of the State
is authorized to prescribe".'
Eminent authorities writing
I" The Majority Report in the contested election case of Davidson v.
Gilbert and the Minority Report in Parsons v. Saunders, supra, n. 103,
expressed the view that Congress had no such power. Before the 1842 Act
was passed, the report of the Senate Committee to which it was referred,
also denied that Congress possessed such power. Senate Document 119,
22nd
Cong., 1st Sess.
0
Suupra, n. 70.
Colegrove v. Green, 8upra, n. 106, 555, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, after

109In

referring to the requirement in the Act of 1842 that elections to Congress
be by districts, states: "Strangely enough, the power to do so was seriously
questioned; it was still doubted by a Committee of Congress as late as 1901."
As early as 1880, in Ex Parts Slebold, 100 U. S. 371, 384 (1879), the Court
said:
"Congress has partially regulated the subject heretofore. In 1842,
it passed a law for the election of representatives by separate districts;
and, subsequently, other laws fixing the time of election, and directing
that the elections shall be by ballot. No one will pretend, at least at the
present day, that these laws were unconstitutional because they only
partially cover the subject."
''Ex parte Siebold, tbid; Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884)
Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S. 399 (1879) ; United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383
(1915) ; Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232 (1921).
u Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 855, 366 (1932).
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in the law journals 12 have expressed the opinion that Congress' regulatory powers over federal elections embraces
the authority to enact federal redistricting laws.
Whether or not it would be wise for Congress to exercise such authority, assuming it to exist, is another matter.
The view has been expressed that the present system of individual state gerrymandering is preferable to gerrymandering on a national scale which may be the consequence of
a federal act."" On the other hand, it has been suggested
that the danger of gerrymandering would probably be less
in Washington than in the state legislatures due to the relatively greater amount of publicity afforded Congressional
activities."
Were Congress to enact such a statute, it would be faced
with at least two imposing difficulties. If a federal redistricting act were passed without taking into account the
practice in many states of electing state and federal officials
from the same districts, such formidable administrative
difficulties might result as to require the holding of separate
state and federal elections. A similar obstacle to Congressional districting is the custom of never redistricting a state
so that an incumbent's residence will be outside the new
district." 5 These two practical, if not legal, impediments to
equitable districting would have to be given serious thought
before any federal redistricting scheme were attempted.
F. Attacks Based Upon State ConstitutionalProvisions.
Appellate tribunals in two states" 6 have held that a Congressional gerrymander which violates a state constitum Bowman, Congressional Redistricting and the Constitution, 31 Mich.
L. Rev. 149, 177-178 (1932); Chafee, Congressional Reapportionment, 42
Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1016 (1929), fn. 4.
Bowman, ibid, 179.
114SCHMECKEBIER,

CONGRESsIoNAL APPORTIONMENT

(1941)

143.

He also

points out that the reports and files of the Census Bureau contain all the
statistical and geographical data necessary for districting the states.
m'The Constitution merely requires that Representatives reside in the
state they represent. Art. I, Sec. 2. Some of the states provide by statute
that a Representative must reside in the Congressional district from which
he is elected. The Maryland Law imposes no such requirement. Md. Code
(1951), Art. 33, Secs. 129-136.
ulBrown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S. E. 105 (1932) and Moran v.
Bowley, 347 Ill. 148, 179 N. E. 526 (1932). Cf. Richardson v. McChesney,
128 Ky. 363, 108 S. W. 322 (1908).
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tional standard of approximate equality of population will
be overthrown. Although the courts in both instances relied
upon the limitations imposed upon Congressional districting by the 1911 Federal Apportionment Act (which they
held to still be in force),117 both also took the position that
the same result would follow because of similar limitations
found in the constitutions of the states themselves. Lending
support to the latter view are Supreme Court decisions " 8
which have uniformly held that other state constituted
provisions relating to Congressional districting may (in the
absence of contrary federal regulations) validly be applied
to Congressional districting.
There thus is ample precedent for the review of Congressional districting acts for compliance with standards,
such as compactness, contiguity, and approximate equality
of population, in those relatively few states whose constitutions contain such checks upon legislative authority."'
While an avenue of possible judicial intervention in Congressional districting would be provided by the adoption of
like provisions in more of the states, it would seem that the
state legislatures, who are responsible for the prevalance of
Congressional gerrymandering, are hardly likely to initiate
constitutional amendments designed to proscribe such a
favored political device.
U7 Both cases were decided before Wood v. Broom, 287 U. S. 1 (1932), in
which the Supreme Court held that the limitations contained in the 1911
Act were no longer in effect. See supra, ns. 70-78.
us Smiley v. Holm, 8upra, n. 111 [Congressional redistricting act held
subject to gubernatorial veto power] ; accord: Carroll v. Becker, 285 U. S.
380 (1932) ; Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U. S. 375 (1932) ; Davis v. Ohio, 241 U. S.
565 (1916) (Congressional redistricting act held subject to popular referendum].
'1 While the Maryland Constitution contains no such express provisions,
it might be contended that gerrymandering violates the spirit, if not the
letter, of Article 7 of the Declaration of Rights, which provides:
"That the right of the People to participate in the Legislature is the
best security of liberty and the foundation of all free Government; for
this purpose elections ought to be free and frequent, and every male
citizen having the qualifications prescribed 'by the Constitution, ought
to have the right of suffrage."

Federal election districts are provided for by statute in Maryland.
Supra, n. 115.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL..-XVI

IV. CONCLUSION
For the most part, attempts to secure effective judicial
relief against the gerrymandering of legislative districts
have been stymied by the reluctance of the courts to intervene in a field which traditionally has been considered to
be the special province of the legislature. Although, on the
state level, the courts will review legislative reapportionment and redistricting acts for compliance with state constitutional safeguards of compactness, contiguity and equality
of population, only those acts which reflect a gross abuse of
legislative discretion have been invalidated. Moreover, in

the all too frequent instances where gerrymanders have
resulted from legislative failure to reapportion or redistrict
in order to meet shifts in population over the years, the
courts have consistently refused to intervene.
On the federal level, the absence of such statutory safeguards as are contained in most of the state constitutions
and judicial reluctance to upset the delicate balance of
federal-state relations, have resulted in the classification
of gerrymandering as a political question. Congressional
failure, especially since the Colegrove decisions, to reenact
into law the standards contained in the Apportionment Acts
up to 1911 may be viewed as a manifestation of legislative
policy approving judicial non-intervention. Consequently,
the current status of the law would seem to permit the unfettered exercise of discretion by the state legislatures in
Congressional districting, subject only to state constitutional restrictions, if any, and the right of the House to
judge the qualifications of its members.
In view of this existing judicial impotency, the question
arises as to what means are available to assure an equitable
legislative basis of representation. Probably the most
direct, and perhaps the most effective means of accomplishing this result, lies in the awakening of popular interest by
means of publicizing the inequities of the present apportionment and districting arrangements in most of the states.
Once this interest has been aroused, the voters not only have
the power to elect candidates who will enact procedural
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reforms and eliminate outmoded and consequently unfair
distributions of electoral strength, but also, in many states,
the power to themselves initiate and secure such reforms.120
In the same manner that national criticism of the Congressional failure to reapportion the states after the 1920
census led to the adoption of the present system of automatic reapportionment after each federal census, 2 ' the enlightenment of the voters in the individual states may lead
to the adoption of similar safeguards designed to reduce the
possibility of future gerrymandering at the state level. One
such safeguard would be to divest the state legislatures of
the power to reapportion and redistrict and designate an
executive body (subject to judicial compulsion) to perform
either or both of these functions. Another would be the
adoption by more of the states of the minimal constitutional
standard of approximate population equality among Congressional districts. Other possible constitutional and statutory reforms are available and lie ready to be tested in the
political laboratories of the individual states.'22
Gerrymandering strikes at one of the mainsprings of our
democratic system of government. Only after it has been
eliminated will our legislatures regain their truly representative character.

1,See e.g., Webster, Voters Take the Law in Hand, 35 Nat. Munic. Rev.,
240-5 (1946), relating how an equitable apportionment was obtained by the
voters in the State of Washington through the use of the initiative and
referendum.
I Supra, n. 68.
IU Symposium on Legislative Apportionment, 17 Law and Contemp. Prob.
253 (1952), especially the following articles: Harvey, Reapportionment of
State Legislatures - Legal Requirements, 364-376; Short, States That Have
Not Met Their ConstitutionalRequirements, 337-386; Bone, States Attempting to Comply with Reapportionment Requirements, 387-416.

